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DUAL DISTRIBUTION PROMOTIONAL ALLOWANCES:
THE FRED MEYER AMENDMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
In Federal Trade Commission v. Fred Meyer, Inc.,1 the FTC charged a
supermarket chain with violating § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act2 by knowingly receiving promotional allowances made in violation
of § 2(d) of the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act.3
The case involved the interpretation of § 2(d) which prohibits a seller
from making payments for the promotion of his product to any of his cus-
tomers unless he makes payments available on a proportionally equal ba-
sis to "all customers competing in the distribution of such products."
The Supreme Court held, in a situation where food producers sold to
wholesalers and directly to a retail chain, that the wholesalers and the re-
tail chain were not competing customers within the meaning of the quoted
phrase, but that the wholesaler's retail customers and the retail chain were
"competing customers" and that the wholesalers' customers were entitled
to receive promotional allowances proportionally equal to those granted
the chain.
II. THE PROM,1OTIONAL ALLOWANCE PLAN INVOLVED
Meyer operated a thirteen-store chain of supermarkets in the Portland,
Oregon area. Its stores accounted for approximately twenty-five percent
of the retail grocery business within the Portland area. It was conceded
that Meyer was in competition with all retail grocery stores selling within
1390 U.S. 341 (March 18, 1968).
2 74 Star 200, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1965). The use of § 5 was required to bring the ac-
tion against the buyer since § 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat- 1526, 15 U.S.C. § 13(f)
(1965), prohibits only knowingly receiving a discriminatory price. Knowingly receiving a dis-
proportionate promotional allowance has been held to be a violation of § 5. R H. Macy & Co.
v. FTC, 326 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1964); Giant Food, Inc. v. FTC, 307 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1962),
cert denied, 372 U.S. 910 (1963); Fred Meyer, Inc. v. FTC, 359 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1966).
It is assumed herein that the test used to determine a violation is the same in a buyer induce-
ment case as it is in a case where the action is brought against the seller under § 2(d) alone. It
is, of course, possible that an unfair method of competition could be found even though the pro-
motional allowance was not made in violation of § 2(d). This is particularly true with respect
to buyer inducement cases where an argument of preemption based on § 2 (d) may be less per-
suasive because of the limited scope of § 2(f).
349 Stat. 1526, 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1965). It shall be unlawful for any person engaged
in commerce to pay or contract for the payment of anything of value to or for the
benefit of a customer of such person in the course of such commerce as compensation
or in consideration for any services or facilities furnished by or through such cus-
tomer in connection with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of any
products or commodities manufactured, sold, or offered for sale by such person, un-
less such payment or consideration is available on proportionally equal terms to all
other customers competing in the distribution of such products or commodities.
A comprehensive text on the subject is F. RowE, PRIcE DIScRIaINATION UNDER THE ROBIN-
SON-PATMANI ACT, (1962) (including a 1964 supplement).
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the area. Meyer had for several years conducted an annual promotional
campaign featuring a coupon book. The book generally contained seventy-
two pages, each page consisting of a coupon which allowed the consumer
to purchase the specified product at a reduced rate-often three units for
the price of two. The book, which was sold to the consumer for ten cents,
was alleged to have a value of fifty-four dollars in cost saving.
Meyer's suppliers, most of whom were food producers who sold di-
rectly to Meyer, contributed to the cost of the promotional campaign in
two ways. First, the suppliers paid a flat rate, generally $350.00, for
each of the featured products supplied by them to cover the cost of print-
ing the coupon book. Secondly, the suppliers subsidized the price reduc-
tion of the featured product by redeeming the coupons or supplying with-
out charge the additional amount of their products sold pursuant to the
coupon plan.
The FTC found4 that Meyer had violated § 2(f) of the Robinson-
Patman Act5 by knowingly receiving a discriminatory price and had vio-
lated § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act8 by knowingly receiving
a disproportionate promotional allowance. It further found that the sub-
sidies were in substance price concessions and as such they were made in
violation of § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act," which prohibits the
granting of discriminatory prices, and the flat rate promotional allowances
were paid in violation of § 2(d) since they were not made available to the
suppliers' other customers on a proportionally equal basis. A cease and
desist order was accordingly issued.8
Meyer appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit0 on a
number of issues, only one of which reached the Supreme Court and will
be considered herein. Meyer claimed that the § 2(d) violation was not
established with respect to two of its suppliers, Tri-Valley Packing Asso-
ciation and Idaho Canning Company, because these two suppliers, unlike
the other suppliers on which the § 2(d) violation was based, made no di-
rect sales nor engaged in other direct dealings with any retail grocery
stores that competed with Meyer. Although the two suppliers sold to
Portland area wholesalers whose retail customers competed with it, Meyer
maintained that the wholesalers were not entitled to receive proportionally
equal promotional allowances because they were not competing customers
4 Fxed Meyer, Inc., [1961-1963 Transfer Binder) CCH TRADE REG. RiP. 5 16,368 (FTC
1963).
549 Stat 1526, 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1965).
6 74 Stat. 200, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1965). See note 2 supra.
7 49 Star. 1526, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1965).
8 Supra note 4 at 5 15,704, modified, 5 16,368 at p. 21, 229-31.
9 Fred Meyer, Inc. v. FTC, 359 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1966). To thoroughly understand the
position of the court of appeals it is helpful to consider its opinions in Standard Oil Co. of Calif.
v. Perkins, 396 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1968); Tri-Valley Packing Assn. v. FTC, 329 F. 2d 694 (9th
Cir. 1964); and, Klein v. Lionel Corp., 237 F. 2d 13 (3rd Cir. 1956).
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within the meaning of § 2(d). This, Meyer claimed, resulted from the
established principle of law and parties who operate on different func-
tional levels within the chain of distribution are not in competion with
each other. The court of appeals on the basis of its prior ruling in Tri-
Valley Packing Assn. v. FTC10 agreed with Meyer and reversed the Com-
mission on this point.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ORIGINAL INTERPRETATION
The effect of the court of appeals decision is dearly anomalous when
considered in the light of the congressional purpose11 behind the Robin-
son-Patman Act. The Act was intended to protect the smaller competitors
from the competitively disadvantageous situation which results when larger
competitors use their buying power to obtain price or service concessions
from their suppliers. The history of the Act centers around the food re-
tailing industry. Congress considered the tremendous buying power of
the chain stores to be a substantial threat to the existence of the independ-
ent retailers.
Today the chain stores, because of the tremendous volume of their
purchases, buy directly from the food producers, whereas the independ-
ents are forced to buy through wholesalers. The direct buying chains,
even though they are performing the function of wholesalers, are consid-
ered to be operating on the functional level of retailers. Since the whole-
salers operate on a different functional level and, therefore, have not
been considered competing customers within the meaning of § 2(d), the
suppliers have been free to treat the chain stores and the wholesalers as
different types of customers and accordingly give each different price and
service treatment. Thus, the independents, for whose benefit the Act was
primarily intended, are effectively excluded from it protection.
Section 2 was originally enacted in 1914.12 It prohibited a seller from
charging his competing purchasers different prices for the same grade and
quantity of merchandise when the effect of the price differentials may be
substantially to lessen competition. However, it was soon established that
purchasers on different functional levels were not in competition with each
other.13  Price discrimination (i.e., price differentals not justified by dif-
ferences in the quantity or quality of the merchandise) between different
functional levels did not produce the requisite adverse effect on competi-
tion and was, therefore, outside the terms of the statute. Congressional
10 329 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1964).
11 See Rowe, supra note 3, chapter 1; FEDERAL 'TADE COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT ON
THE CHAIN-SToRE INVI=rIGATION, S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935); S. Res. No.
224, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 69 Cong. Rec. 7857 (1928).
12 38 Star. 730 (1914).
13 See General Foods Corp., 52 F.T.C. 798 (1956).
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dissatisfaction 14 over the limited reach of § 2 of the Clayton Act and its
failure to prevent price discrimination by indirect means, led to its amend-
ment by the Robinson-Pattman Act' in 1936. The amendment changed
the original § 2 in two ways. Firstly, the original § 2, which be-
came § 2(a), was modified to prohibit price discrimination either when
the effect may be substantially to lessen competition or when it may injure
competition "with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the
benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them." This
added phrase, typical of § 2 in its lack of clarity, was construed to prohibit
price discrimination when the adverse competitive effect could be shown
to exist within any of the three functional levels of competition described
-i.e., competition with the seller (the primary line), between the custom-
ers of the seller (the secondary line) or between the customers of the cus-
tomers of the seller (the tertiary line). For example, in FTC v. Morton
Salt Co.,' the Supreme Court upheld a cease and desist order restricting
the price differential Morton could maintain between its wholesale and re-
tail purchasers because the differential had an adverse effect on the ability
of the wholesaler's retail customers to compete with the direct buying cus-
tomers.
The second area of amendment to § 2 was the addition of a number of
subsections some of which prohibit specific forms of indirect price discrim-
ination. Subsection 2(c) 17 prohibits the seller from granting a dummy
brokerage allowance to a purchaser or agent of the purchaser. Subsection
2(d), as mentioned above, prohibits a seller from granting a promotional
allowance to any customer unless such allowance is made available to all
customers competing in the distribution of such product. Subsection 2
(e)' 8 prohibits the seller from providing services or facilities to any of its
purchasers in connection with the handling or sale of his product not ac-
corded to all purchasers on a proportionately equal basis. Unlike § 2(a),
§§ 2(c), 2(d), and 2(e) do not require the showing of an adverse effect
on competition.?
There was early and consistent agreement on one point with respect to
§ 2. "[T]he statute imposes a hodgepodge of confusing, inconsistant, and
frequently misdirected restriction. '20  The inconsistency runs in two ways.
14 See note 11 supra.
1549 Star. 1526, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1965).
16 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
1749 Stat 1526, 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1965)
1849 Stat 1526, 15 U.S.C. § 13(e) (1965).
19 Note 4 supra at p. 21, 216.
20 390 U.S. at 359-60 (Justice Harlan). See Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC,
346 U.S. 61 (1953); Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking-udges Who Can't and Legislators
Who Won't, 63 COLUm. L. REV. 787, 793-94 (1963).
You might as well know that the bill finally agreed upon by the conferees ... con-
tains many inconsistencies, and the courts will have the devil's own job to unravel
[VOL. 30
NOTES
Firstly, the "infelicitous language"21 of the various subsections makes it
difficult to interpret the subsections in a manner which gives cohesiveness
to the whole of § 2. Secondly, an interpretation of § 2 which gives effect
to the literal meaning of each of the subsections results in an interpreta-
tion which seems inconsistent with the purpose of the act. The court of
appeals' decision in Meyer22 is the consequence of a long effort to construe
the Act in a manner which gives substantial effect to the literal terms of
each of the subsections consistent with giving all of the subsections a com-
patible meaning.
It was established without significant controversy that the term cus-
tomer meant one who purchased from the seller.23 The rule that compe-
tition, within the meaning of § 2(d), does not exist between different
functional levels resulted from the effect that § 2(a) had on the interpre-
tation of § 2(d). As noted above, the original § 2 was amended in 1936
to include the customers of customers clause which defines the levels of
competition to which the courts may look to find an anticompetitive ef-
fect. Because it had been judicially determined prior to the amendment
that competition did not exist between different functional levels24 and
because the 1936 amendment was an attempt to expand the reach of § 2,25
it was thought that Congress used the term competition to mean only com-
petition within a single functional level. Otherwise the § 2(a) customers
of customers clause would be meaningless. Therefore, the term competi-
tion had to be interpreted to include only intralevel competition unless it
was to be given a different meaning in § 2(d) than it had in § 2(a).
The courts2a and the FTC27 refused to give it a different meaning.2 In
the tangle. In an endeavor to get some sort of an agreement, the [Senate bill] ...
[was) grafted onto the House bill, and we have what might be termed in common
parlance somewhat of a "hodgepodge".... You have the herculean task to make it
yield sense. 80 Cong. Rec. 9419 (1936) (remarks of Representative Celler).
2 1 Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 78 (1953).
2 2 Note 9 supra,
23 FTC Guides for Advertising Allowances and Other Merchandising Payments and Ser-
vices; Compliance With Section 2(d) and 2(e) of the Clayton Act, 16 C.F.R. § 240.3 (1968).
24 See General Foods Corp., 52 F.T.C. 798 (1956).
2 5 See note 11 supra.
26 See note 9 supra.
2 7 Atalanta Trading Corp., 53 F.T.C. 565 (1956), reversed on other grounds, 258 F.2d 365
(2d Cir. 1958); see General Foods Corp., 52 F.T.C. 798 (1956).
28 The effect of this interpretation has been somewhat mitigated by the "indirect customer
doctrine." Under this doctrine customers who acquired a product through an intermediary have
been considered to be customers of the original seller when the seller had engaged in direct deal-
ings with a customer. See e.&, American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104 (2d Cir.), cert denied,
371 U.S. 824 (1962) (Retailer bypassed intermediary distributor to negotiate directly with
magazine publisher); Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. FTC, 156 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946), cert denied,
331 U.S. 806 (1947) (Manufacturers who provided demonstrators for some of its customers
who purchased through wholesalers was obligated under § 2(e) to provide demonstrators to all
customers purchasing through wholesalers); K. S. Corp. v. Chemstrand Corp., 198 F. Supp. 310
(S.D.N.Y. 1961) (Direct dealing with manufacturer by-passing wholesaler in private action
based on §§ 2(d) and (e)). But see, Klien v. Lionel Corp., 237 F.2d 13 (3rd Cir. 1956)
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light of the fact that Congress dealt specifically with the term in § 2(a),
this result seems reasonable.
The Commission maintained this position until 1959 when, in the case
of Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. Inc.,2" it abandoned the theory of abso-
lute functional segregation. In that case the Commission considered
whether a cigarette manufacturer who gave promotional allowances to
vending machine operators was required to make the allowances propor-
tionally available to wholesalers whose customers sold over the counter.
The Commission found that competition did not exist between the whole-
salers and the vending machine operators, but unlike its prior cases, it
based its decision on a lack of evidence to support the claim of competi-
tionY0 In Meyer it was conceded that Meyer was in competition with all
independent groceries retailing in the Portland area. The Commission
found that the economic prosperity of the wholesalers was dependent on
their ability to supply the independent retailers at prices and levels of as-
sistance which would enable them to compete with the chain stores.3 '
The economic interdependence between the wholesalers and their custom-
ers was enough to establish that the wholesalers were in competition with
Meyer.32
The FTC thus gave competition a different meaning in § 2(d) than it
has had in § 2(a). It attempted to justify this paradox by distinguishing
the subsections in two ways.33 Firstly, it noted that each type of conduct
described in §§ 2(c), 2(d), and 2(e) is a per se violation whereas that
defined in § 2(a) is prohibited only when the requisite anticompetitive
effect is shown. The Commission pointed out that the Supreme Court 4
had noted that Congress may have considered the indirect forms of price
discrimination prohibited by §§ 2(c), (d), and (e) to be a greater threat
to competition because of their "secret" nature. Its prohibition was made
absolute to force the offending seller to use the more direct forms of price
discrimination because they are more easily detected and evaluated. The
Commission reasoned that because Congress had acted with a greater se-
(Plaintiff attempted to invoke the doctrine on the ground that manufacturer fixed the retail price
of the product. Court held that notwithsanding the fact that the doctrine might apply on these
facts in an action brought by the FTC it would not apply in a treble damage action.).
29 56 F.T.C. 221 (1959).
3o1,d. at 248.
31 This is sometimes referred to as the "conduit" theory of interfunctional level comped-
non. Cf. FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963) discussed in text to note 37 infra.
32 Fred Meyer, Inc., [1961-1963 Transfer Binder] CCH TRADE REG. REP. 5 16,368 at p.
21,214-15 (FTC 1963). Notwithstanding a reversal in the court of appeals of its Alcycr deci-
sion, the Commission again found interlevel competition in Clariol, Inc., [1965-1967 Transfer
Binder] CCH TRADE REG. REP. 5 17,594 (FTC 1966).
33 Fred Meyer, Inc, [1961-1963 Transfer Binder] CCH TRADE REG. REP. 9 16,368 at p.
21,215-16 (FTC 1963).
34 FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., Inc., 360 U.S. 55 (1959).
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verity against the "secret descriminations,"as it was reasonable to give the
term competition a broader meaning in § 2(d) than it has in § 2(a). Sec-
ondly, the Commission emphasized the importance of the word "distribu-
tion" as used in the § 2(d) phrase "customers competing in the distribu-
tion of such products." It reasoned that because the wholesalers were
engaged in the distribution of food products they were included in § 2(d)
by its literal meaning.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S NEW INTERPRETATION
The Supreme Court granted certiorari "because the case presents im-
portant questions concerning the scope of a key provision of the Robin-
son-Patman Act."30  It agreed with the court of appeals that the two
wholesalers were not in competition with Meyer. The Supreme Court's
1963 decision, FTC v. Sun Oil Co.,37 was thought to be contolling on this
point. In that case Sun had granted price reductions to one of its service-
station dealers to enable him to meet the price of a competing retailer
across the street. The FTC found that Sun had violated § 2(a) of the
Robinson-Patman Act because its other dealers in the area were not given
the same price reduction and, as a result, they lost business to the favored
dealer. Sun claimed that its price reduction was made "to meet an equally
low price of a competitor" and thus allowed as a defense under § 2(b) .3
Sun argued that even though the § 2 (b) defense does not expressly apply
to a situation where a distributor grants a reduced price to meet the threat
from his customers competitors, it should apply because Sun was in sub-
stance competing in the retail gasoline market, and because § 2(b) was in-
tended as a defense to § 2(a) and should be as broad in scope as § 2(a).
The Court held, however, that
There is no reason appearing on the face of the statute to assume that
Congress intended to invoke by omission in § 2(b) the same broad
meaning of competition or competitor which it explicitly provided by
indusion in § 2(a); the reasonable inference is quite the contrary. 39
In Meyer, the Court reasoned analogously with respect to § 2 (d). It em-
phasized
that when Congress wished to expand the meaning of competition to in-
dude more than resellers operating on the same functional level, it knew
how to do so in unmistakeable terms. It did so in section § 2 (a)....40
To avoid sanctioning the anomalous result reached by the court of ap-
peals, the Court, in what Mr. Justice Harlan called a judicial tour de
35 ld. at 68, n. 12.
36 390 U.S. at 343.
7 371 U.S. 505 (1963).
3849 Stat. 1526, 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1965).
39 371 U.S. at 515.
40 390 U.S. at 356-57.
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force4 and Mr. Justice Stewart called a denial of due process,42 redefined
the term customer. For the first time in thirty-two years, the Court de-
cided that the wholesaler's customers who were in competition with Meyer
were customers of their wholesaler's suppliers.43  The Court recognized
that Commissioner Elman had argued for this position44 and that it had
been rejected by the Commission, to whose expertise deference is accorded.
But the Court was of the opinion that its interpretation was the "most
reasonable.1 45  It emphasized that under the Commission's interpretation
the wholesaler would not be required to pass on the promotional allow-
ance it received to its customers and that it could not be presumed that
Congress intended the allowances to be paid to a party in a higher level
in the chain of distribution who may or may not pass it on to the level
where the impact would be felt directly.46
It is interesting to consider the significance of the pass-on question.
The Court's concern appears to be not that the benefits of the promo-
tional allowance in fact are passed on to the wholesaler's customers but
that the wholesaler's customers be able to participate directly in the pro-
motional plan if they so desire. What seems important for the protec-
tion of free competition is that the independents receive the same pro-
portionally equal economic benefits that their competitors (the chains)
receive. Due to the nature of promotional allowances, it is unlikely that a
wholesaler would be able to receive a promotional allowance without sub-
stantially passing on the economic benefits of that allowance to its cus-
tomers.48
41 390 U.S. at 359.
42390 U.S. at 363-64. Mr. Justice Stewart noted that certiorari had been granted limited
to the single question whether the wholesalers were entitled to receive the promotional allow-
ances; and that the theory on which the Court based its decision was not briefed or argued be-
fore the Court. Justice Stewart, citing cf. Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948), thought that
Meyer at least should have the opportunity to defend.
43 390 U.S. at 348.
44 Fred Meyer, Inc., [1961-1963 Transfer Binder] CCH TRADE REG. REP. 5 16,368 at p.
21,231 (FTC 1963). Commissioner Elman (concurring in part and dissenting in part) noted
that §§ 2(d) and 2(e) were in pari materia and that in Elizabeth Arden v. FTC, 156 F.2d 132(2d Cir. 1946), cert denied, 331 U.S. 806 (1947), an order was sustained under § 2 (e) compel-
ling Arden to make demonstrators available to retailers who purchased from wholesalers and
were in competition with retailers who had received demonstrators directly from Arden. But
the Arden case, because the favored retailers purchased their products through wholesalers, has
been considered an "indirect customer" case, (discussed at note 28 supra) and is of questionable
support for Commissioner Elman's argument; see also F. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMNATION UN-
DER THE ROBINSoN-PATMAN AcT, (1962) at 398.
45 390 U.S. at 357. It has not infrequently been held that the FTC will be upheld if its
decision is not unreasonable or unsound. E.g., P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 267 F.2d 439,443 (3rd
Cir. 1959).
46 390. U.S. at 357.
47 Id. at 356.
48 It is important to note that this argument (suggested here with respect to whether the
wholesaler or his customers should receive the allowances) is distinguishable from the "cow
bell" theory argued unsuccessfully as a defense to § 2(d) and § 2(e) cases. e.g. Elizabeth Ar-
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There is a substantial question whether the Court's decision requires
the supplier to do what cannot practically be done.49 Wholesalers exist
primarily because the customers they serve are too numerous and too small
to be dealt with directly by the supplier. Prior to the Meyer case a sup-
plier could segregate his customers by the use of wholesalers and deal di-
rectly only with those customers who were large enough to make direct
dealing practical. Since a supplier cannot legally use a promotional al-
lowance plan which cannot be made proportionately available to all of its
customers, practical problems of reaching the many small retailers may
substantially reduce the use of promotional allowances. Not only is the
reduction in the use of promotional allowances contrary to the intention
of § 2(d) which requires only proportionality in treatment, but it may be
harmful to competition as well. Promotional allowance plans might well
be a successful means by which a small supplier can introduce his product
into a new market or an established supplier gain acceptance for a new
product.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren suggested that this problem could be elimi-
nated by a supplier using his established wholesale connections to make
promotional allowances available to the independents "so long as the sup-
plier takes responsibility ... for seeing that the allowances are made avail-
able to all who compete in the resale of his product."50 Mr. Justice Harlan
argued that on the basis of Albrecht v. Herald Co. 1 a supplier could not
compel his wholesalers to pass on the benefits to his customers without
violating the Sherman Act.
Mr. Justice Fortas' brief opinion ostensibly concurring with the Court
den v. FTC, 156 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 806 (1947). In Arden the
argument was that product demonstrators provided a few large retailers would benefit all re-
tailers selling the product since the customer might be persuaded to buy the product in one store
and actually purchase it in another. Here the argument is that the retailer will be benefited if
his wholesaler receives the allowance or service. Unlike the "cow bell" theory, no contention
is implied that the retailer will not be harmed competively if neither he nor his wholesaler re-
ceives an allowance or service given to other retailers or their wholesalers.
At the very least it could be argued that allowances received by the wholesalers would en-
hance -their financial strength and, thus, their ability to supply their customers at prices and ser-
vice levels that would make them more able to compete successfully with the chains. Accord-
ingly, benefits received by wholesalers would indirectly accrue to their customers.
49 Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Harlan, in their dessenting opinions, criticized the
Court's holding in this regard.
50 390 U.S. at 358.
51390 U.S. 145 (1968). In Albrecht defendant newspaper hired an independent contrac-
tor to solicit business away from one of its franchised delivery route operators who had been
charging retail prices for the newspapers greater than those "suggested" by defendant. The
Court held that a Sherman Act § 1 "combination" existed between the newspaper and the con-
tractor-solicitor because the latter was aware that the purpose of the job for which he was hired
was to force the delivery route operator to lower his prices. The Court also found the enforce-
ment of a maximum price was unreasonable per se. If a supplier attempted to force his whole-
salers to pass-on a promotional allowance to the wholesaler's customers, it is quite possible that
the Court would find the supplier to be in a combination with his wholesalers, and that the
forced pass-on was in effect a mandatory price reduction, or fixed maximum price, and unrea-
sonable per se.
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raises some question as to the nature of the supplier's obligation to afford
his wholesaler's customers an opportunity to participate in an allowance
plan, suggesting that the intention of Congress
can best be squared with the language of § 2(d) by the device of regard-
ing the wholesaler and his retail customer as a unit for purposes of that
section .. . The supplier may satisfy this obligation by direct dealing
with the competing retailer or by arrangement with the wholesaler rea-
sonably designed [emphasis added] to transmit to the retailer participa-
tion in the program if the retailer -chooses to accept. 52
It is questionable what "reasonably designed" requires the supplier to do
and if the term means the same as the Court meant by the supplier taking
the responsibility of providing its wholesaler's customers with an oppor-
tunity to participate. That is, has a supplier violated § 2(d) if, in a par-
ticular situation, a customer of its wholesaler actually was denied an op-
portunity to participate, or does a violation result only if the plan used by
the supplier did not, at the time of its initiation, offer a reasonable likeli-
hood that the wholesaler would provide a means by which its customers
could directly participate. For example, is the supplier in violation if he
offers his wholesaler an allowance plan whereby the supplier provides a
substantial subsidy for the cost of newspaper advertising, providing that
the advertisement identifies any of the wholesaler's customers who distrib-
ute the product and request that their retail establishments be identified
as a distributors of the product, and the wholesaler refuses to accept the
allowance? In addition there is a question of how direct the participation
by the wholesaler's customers must be. That is, assuming that the eco-
nomic benefit of an allowance is substantially transmitted to the wholesal-
er's customers by the wholesaler using the allowance to advertise the prod-
uct, how much control over the details of the plan must be given to the
retail customers. For example, in the above mentioned hypothetical, would
that plan result in a violation if each of the wholesaler's customers were
not afforded the same degree of control over the format of the advertise-
ment as a direct buying chain was allowed, even though the wholesaler
was given control equal to that given the chain? Or could the wholesaler
rotate on a daily or weekly basis the retailers who were identified in the
advertisement to avoid overly detracting from the value of the advertise-
ment by using an inordinant amount of the space to list its hundreds of
retail customers? These questions were not covered in the MIeyer decision.
They are suggested here as factors on which future cases may be distin-
guished.
Another important question is raised by the Court's holding that the
wholesalers were not competing customers within the meaning of § 2(d).
52 390 U.S. at 359.
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They were, therefore, not entitled to receive promotional allowances. 53
Does a wholesaler whose business has been damaged or destroyed by a
supplier's favoritism for a direct buying chain have a cause of action
against the supplier?5 To deny the wholesaler a cause of action would
seem to disregard unfairly the economic realities resulting from the fiscal
interdependence between the wholesaler and his customers. 5 Further-
more, the Court emphasized 56 just three months after the Meyer decision
that important public purposes are served through the treble damage ac-
tion by arming private attorney generals to enforce the antitrust laws. Al-
though the independent retailers outnumber the wholesalers, their rela-
tively small scale operations on limited financial resources make them
much less likely candidates to prosecute a treble damage action.
It would be paradoxical for the Court to deny the independent retail-
ers a cause of action for a § 2 (d) violation since the Court held in Meyer
that the independents were entitled to receive the allowances. But noth-
ing in the Meyer decision necessarily precludes both the independents and
the wholesalers from being considered competitive customers for the pur-
poses of a private action. Damages could possibly be allowed to a whole-
saler on the basis of an apportionment between the wholesaler and his
customers. This approach could perhaps be strengthened by the argu-
ment that since the chains perform for themselves a wholesaler function,
the chains are competing with the wholesalers at least to the extent of
their wholesale operations. A second possible theory on which recovery
could be allowed is to permit the wholesaler to show that he suffered
damages from a loss of sales which occured because his customers were at
a competitive disadvantage to an illegally favored chain and, as a result,
suffered a loss of sales themselves. Both theories would, of course, pro-
duce very complex-and perhaps overly speculative--problems in calcu-
lating damages. Still, in those situations where the violation is a continu-
ing one, an injunction may be a practical remedy for a wholesaler.
Questions also arise as to what effect the Court's new interpretation of
§ 2(d) will have on the interpretation of the other subsections of § 2.
For example, § 2(e), which requires that a seller who provides services or
facilities to any of his purchasers make the services or facilities available
on a proportionally equal basis to all of his purchasers is very similar in
its proscription to § 2(d). Although § 2(d) uses the term customer
whereas § 2(e) uses the term purchaser, it has been held that the statutes
53 1Oin the facts of this case, § 2(d) reaches only discrimination between customers
competing for resales at the same functional level and, therefore, does not mandate
proportional equality between Meyer and the two wholesalers. 390 U.S. at 348-49.
,4 It should be remembered that no private action will lie against the buyer under § 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act.
55 See e.g., Krug v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 142 F. Supp. 230 (D.N.J. 1956).
5 0 Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
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are in pari materia 7 and that the terms customer and purchaser are to be
given the same meaning.5 8 There seems little reason why § 2(e) will not
be controlled by the Meyer decision.
The effect of the Meyer decision on the interpretation of the term
purchaser as used in § 2(a) is, however, a different question. Here the
old meaning will probably prevail. Firstly, because if a Meyer meaning
were given to the term purchaser in § 2(a), the customers of customers
clause would be made virtually meaningless since it is difficult to imagine
a situation where customers on the same functional level were not in com-
petition but their customers (or the customers of their customers) were
competing. Secondly, there is Supreme Court precedent recognizing pur-
chasers in different functional levels as purchasers within the meaning
of § 2(a)."5
It is quite possible then, that the term purchaser will be given a double
meaning within § 2. This will create no less of a paradox than giving com-
petition a double meaning. It is also interesting to note that § 2(a),
which, as the Court noted in Sun Oil,60 was expressly given a broad mean-
ing, may now be more limited than §§ 2(d) and 2(e). As noted above,§ 2(a) applies only if the anticompetitive effect is shown to exist within
the sellers functional level of either of two functional levels below the
seller. It has been held"' that the subsection does not apply when the
anticompetitive effect is within the third level below the seller 02 -i.e.,
competition with a customer or a customer of a customer of the seller.
Meyer, however, may be taken to mean that one who competes with a di-
rect buyer is a "customer" regardless of how many intermediaries are be-
tween him and the seller.
One further question should be considered with respect to the applica-
tion of Meyer. Will it apply when the wholesaler, rather than a direct
buying retailer, receives the favored treatment ?63 Even if the wholesaler
is considered in this situation to be a "customer," a result consistent with
Meyer may dictate a finding that the wholesaler was not in competition
with the direct buying chain. On the other hand, if the independent re-
tailers (the wholesaler's customers) are considered to be customers for
the purpose of § 2(d), did they "receive" the promotional allowance the
supplier paid the wholesaler?
57Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. FTC, 156 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 806
(1947).
5 8 Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 499, 502 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 88 (1962).
9 FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
60 FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963).
61 Standard Oil Co. of Calif. v. Perkins, 396 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1968).
621t has been suggested that it is a practical impossibility to substantiate a claim of an in-
jurious effect below the secondary level. See Rowe, note 3 supra at 1964 Supp. p. 89.




On the facts of this case there seems to be little question that the hold-
ing of the Court (aside from the unanswered practical questions of com-
pliance discussed above) gives § 2(d) a meaning which produces a ra-
tional result. The method used to produce the result is, of course, a
highly transparent fiction. The question of whether the fiction used by
the Court is more or less transparent than the fiction used by the FTC is
moot. The two different fictions may, however, produce significantly dif-
ferent results. It is perhaps appropriate to restate that the theory accepted
by the Court was rejected by the Commission; and to note that the Court's
theory was not briefed or argued before the Court.6
The real problem involved in the Meyer case (and many other § 2
cases) is that it falls within "The Gap in Lawmaking," described by Judge
Friendly,"5 created by "Judges Who Can't and Legislators Who Won't"
rewrite confusing, inconsistant, and misdirected statutes to give them a
meaning which produces a rational and desirable result. Presumably,
judges "can't" because to do so would be a usurpation of legislative author-
ity. But it appears that legislative authority can be usurped as much
through the use of fiction as without; and the meaning produced by fic-
tion is perhaps more likely to compromise on the rationality of the result.
Possibly it is thought that even the obvious use of a fictional cloak aids
the preservation of judicial integrity. Yet, it is difficult to see how such
indulgence does not contribute to an illusion of disprobity and favor the
opposite effect. The poignant question is "Why Can't Judges."6
Robert G. Martinell
6 390 U.S. 341, 363-64. See note 42 supra.
65 Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can't and Legislators Who Won't, 63
COLUIM. L REV. 787 (1963).
66 It is interesting to note Judge Wortendyke's opinion in Krug v. International Tel. & TeL
Corp., 142 F. Supp. 230 (D.C.N.J. 1956), which indicates it was written by a judge too atten-
tive to the administration of justice to partake in the semantic gymnastics characteristic of many
§ 2 cases. In this case the plaintiff's wholesale business had been destroyed by IT&T's price
and allowance favoritism of direct buying retailers. After overruling a motion to dismiss the §
2(a) count of plaintiffs treble damage complaint, Judge Wortendyke answered a motion to dis-
miss the § 2(d) count in the following manner:
The conclusion reached by the Supreme Court was arrived at by reading the "infelici-
tious language * * * as enacting what we rake to be its purpose" [Automatic Canteen
Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953)]. That approach will be followed here.
It is concluded that the purpose of Section 2(d) is to place discriminatory allow-
ances on the same basis as price discriminations prohibited by Section 2(a) and that
consequently the same set of circumstances give rise to a cause of action under Section
2(d), if the discrimination takes the form of unequal allowances or services, as would
be the case if the discrimination were a direct price discrimination under Section 2(a).
Id. at 236.
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